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Abstract 
The paper focuses on the key attributes that underpin demand for social housing in Malta (an 
EU member state) during the 2000s and the extent to which the demand for social housing is 
addressed by the stock of units that were offered for sale by the Maltese Housing Authority. 
The analysis carried out focuses on the eight sales issues that were launched by the Housing 
Authority between October 2002 and November 2008. The paper presents nine stylized facts 
that underpin underlying demand. In this regard, key attributes of demand include the fact 
that the group of individuals eligible to apply for units from the housing authority has been 
implicitly increasing steadily during the period under review. Furthermore, the major part of 
applicants across the different categories seem to prefer larger three-bedroom apartments 
even though smaller units may be adequate given the number of children and the number of 
persons in the household. Another key stylized fact pertains to the fact that although the 
volume of applicants is quite large giving rise to excess demand, paradoxically a sizeable 
stock of units ends up unsold. The implications of the findings are discussed. The study goes 
on to provides recommendations and suggestions for further research that could better guide 
future buyers, as well as Maltese housing policy makers in their quest to offer affordable 
quality housing for persons with low income, persons with disabilities, and for vulnerable 
persons with social and housing difficulties. 
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Introduction 
This paper focuses on the key attributes that underpin demand for social housing in 
Malta and the extent to which the demand for social housing is addressed by the stock of 
units that are offered for sale by the Maltese Housing Authority. Malta is an island state 
situated in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea. It has a population of 416,055 and an area of 
just over 316 km2, thus making it the most densely populated country in the European Union 
(EU) (NSO, 2012). Despite the fact that land supply is scarce, it has a comparatively sizeable 
social housing sector. Malta has a relatively high rate of home ownership and the lowest 
overcrowding rates for those at risk-of-poverty among the 27 EU member states (Eurostat, 
2012). Despite this, an increasing number of persons in Malta are finding it harder to 
purchase quality housing at affordable prices since the prices are comparatively high when 
compared to the wages. Although there are no visible signs of homelessness, there are a few 
thousands that risk homelessness and the problem is hidden under the façade of strong family 
ties, community cohesion and the benevolent state (Vakili-Zad, 2006). Thus, meeting the 
housing needs of low income earners is essential in reducing the housing poverty experienced 
in a country (Adedeji & Olotuah, 2012). 
 In analysing the underlying demand for social housing in the 2000s, this paper 
identifies the profile and regional distribution of applicants by category of application, in 
conjunction with the preferences of applications in relation to the units issued. The analysis 
focuses on the eight sales issues that were launched by the Housing Authority between 
October 2002 and November 2008. One sale issue was launched every year, during the period 
under consideration except for 2003 when two sale issues were launched. No new sales were 
issued since, at least up to the end of 2012 when this study was finalised. The units of the 
Housing Authority are targeted for people with low income, for persons with disability, and 
for vulnerable persons having social and housing difficulties. The paper identifies nine 
stylised facts that underpin underlying demand and this represents an important milestone for 
the Housing Authority as it portrays the behaviour of applicants towards the Housing 
Authority sale issues. The analysis also brings to light the effectiveness of the conditions and 
allocation process of these issues, thus providing the opportunity for suggesting ways on how 
to improve the design and process of future sale issues.  
Literature Review 
Policy for home ownership  
 The policy of homeownership was actively endorsed by successive UK governments. 
According to McCord et al (2011), this policy was seen as an appeaser of social and 
economic disparity between higher and lower income populations and between 
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homeownership and non-homeownership. This policy direction was also an important part of 
the fabric in Malta within successive administrations. Indeed, potentially in view of Malta’s 
colonial past, and the fact that the Government bureaucracy is largely modelled on the British 
model, the policy of homeownership in Malta may actually originate from the UK. Along 
similar lines, Ronald (2008) outlines that over time, homeownership became deeply 
embedded in the UK psyche as a key aspiration of households. There is little doubt that this is 
also a key attribute of the Maltese psyche too. Within this context, home ownership initiatives 
seek to help households who are on the margins of affordability in respect of owner 
occupation. As outlined by Carasso et al. (2005), the poorest households face additional 
constraints in their quest to become homeowners. In particular, the latter face greater 
difficulty saving the money necessary for a down payment. Moreover, they typically must 
pay higher interest rates due to their creditworthiness position and in the initial years monthly 
mortgage payments tend to be higher than the market rents for the same property. 
 One benefit behind subsidised house purchases that is outlined in the economic 
literature is that housing policy initiatives that seek to reduce housing costs for young people 
would help to stop the growing tendency to delay the formation of new families (Giannelli & 
Monfardini, 2000). Bramley and Morgan (1998) outline that in the UK, the types of home 
ownership initiatives employed can be classified under four generic headings: (a) 
grant/discount/free equity, (b) shared equity/ownership, (c) grant to subsidise costs which are 
greater than the value of the property, and (d) alternative mortgage arrangements. Over the 
period under review in this paper (i.e., 2002-2008), the first two methods were employed by 
the Housing Authority and more recently, the Housing Authority in Malta has also employed 
the latter option. 
Affordability 
 Conceptually, affordability can be subdivided into two segments. One segment of 
affordability pertains to the ability of first time buyers to purchase a property. It is on this 
element of affordability that this paper will seek to focus. Another segment of affordability 
pertains to the ability of households to remain home-owners inter-temporally by being able to 
make repayments. Stone (2006) argued that housing affordability “is expression of the 
subjective social and material experiences of people, constituted as households, in relation to 
their individual housing situations” (p. 151). Within this context, affordability relates to the 
challenge each household faces when balancing the cost of its actual or potential housing, on 
the one hand, and the other non-housing related expenditure within the constraint of the 
applicable disposable income.  Ong (2000) argued that the ability of homeowners to afford a 
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property depends on two factors - household income and the level of mortgage repayments. 
In this regard, outlay becomes more affordable as the household income increases and the 
applicable mortgage interest rate decreases. 
 The economic literature suggests that movement in house price affordability and the 
property cycle are not necessarily independent of one another. In fact, Maclennan (2009) 
suggested that affordability and house price volatility are inseparable. Moreover, McCord et 
al (2011) suggested that house price affordability tend to move concomitantly with the 
cyclicality of the housing market. 
 Although homeownership (as outlined earlier) is a key aspiration for households, 
some quarters are of the view that homeownership may actually be ill-suited for low income 
households. In fact, Pryce and Sprigings (2009) contend that by encouraging homeownership 
within this category, it is possible that “we are subjecting them to the worst of its costs and 
risks while the market may restrict for them the potential of its benefits.” (p. 148) They 
outline that low-income households are more likely to be constrained to resort to leave 
homeownership at the worst point in the property cycle in that they are more likely to face 
economic circumstances that lead to repayment difficulties during a downturn. In this regard, 
affordability became a more pressing issue as the housing bubble which manifested itself in 
several countries in the early 2000s intensified. Affordability constraints have impacted the 
low earning workers severely over the last decade with a gradual decline in both the 
proportion and absolute number of first-time buyers being exhibited in the UK (Whitehead 
and Monk, 2011). 
 Nevertheless, the literature does outline that homeownership has its advantages. In 
this regard, Boehm and Schlottmann (2001) found that the level of education and 
subsequently income levels of children of homeowners tended to be higher than that of non-
homeowners. These results are further confirmed by Haurin et al. (2002) who suggested that 
the cognitive outcomes of children of homeowners are superior to those of non-homeowners, 
even after controlling for demographic, social and economic characteristics. Moreover, 
Bramley and Morgan (1998) argued that although benefits from homeownership are 
essentially private goods, some gains from homeownership take the form of public goods. 
These include social stability and integration, or a better maintained housing stock. 
Methodology 
 The scope of this study was to analyse the valid applications that were submitted 
under all the sale issues during the 2000s and up to 2012, when this study was conducted. 
During this period, eight sales issues were made available. The Housing Authority offered 
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five issues with units sold at subsidized prices and three issues with units offered on a shared 
ownership basis (one-third, two-thirds or full share of property). A breakdown of the different 
sale issues under analysis is outlined in Table 1.  
Table 1: Applications for the Housing Authority Sale Issues of 2002-2008 
Applications 
Date of Issue 
Oct-
02* 
Mar-
03* 
Nov-
03* 
Nov-
04* 
Aug-
05** 
Sep-
06** 
Nov-
07** 
Nov-
08* 
Tot
al 
Valid applications 786 791 593 802 588 916 260 117 4853 
Invalid applications 84 75 36 71 51 53 25 7 402 
Withdrawn 
applications 24 47 15 25 8 31 22 5 177 
Total 894 913 644 898 647 1000 307 129 5432 
* Units sold at Subsidized price, ** Units sold at Subsidized price on basis of shared ownership 
Moreover, the allocation process employed by the Housing Authority divides 
different applicants into three main categories, where different units are specifically issued 
for a particular applicant category. Category A includes families with children, single parents 
with children living with them, and disabled persons. Category B includes engaged couples. 
Category C includes single persons, separated persons without children living with them and 
youths leaving institutions. 
 After examining the overall demand over the years, this study examines the profile of 
the applicants, mainly with respect to their (a) civil status, (b) income, (c) economic activity, 
(d) their preference in relation to the size and type of residence, and (e) the locations they 
accept to live in. This study also tries to better understand why a considerable number of 
issued units are not allocated to any applicant. In examining demand, we computed 
percentage and various indices (e.g., price to income ratio). In the light of the findings that 
emerged, the study provides a series of recommendations aimed at improving the design and 
process of future Housing Authority sale issues. 
Results and Discussion 
Trends in Demand 
 Table 1 shows that a structural break occurred in 2007 which resulted in a 
considerable decline in the total applications submitted in respect of housing unit purchases 
by applicants. Whereas in the period 2002-2006, the average level of valid applications per 
sales issue stood at around 750 applications per issue, in the period 2007-2008, the average 
level of applications declined considerably to a level of 190 applications per issue. This 
decline does not appear to be explained by the fact that the Housing Authority employed 
share ownership sales issue in some of the years, since the two years during which demand 
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was very low incorporated both types of the sales issues employed by the Authority, namely 
units sold at subsidized prices and units sold on the basis of shared ownership basis. The 
decline in demand is hard to explain, particularly in view of the sheer magnitude in the 
contraction in demand for units offered by the Housing authority. The decline in demand 
during the period 2007–2008 was more than a two-thirds retrenchment from the average 
levels registered in the preceding years. This decline occurred at around the same time when 
the climax in the house price boom was reached, and the price to income ratio started to 
exhibit a gradual trend downwards and property affordability started marginally improving 
(see Table 2).  Nevertheless, it is pertinent to point out that although beyond 2006, property 
affordability started improving, affordability levels were still worse than the levels that 
prevailed in the initial year of the period under consideration. In calculating the price to 
income ratio (Table 2), data for prices was obtained from the Central Bank of Malta (CBM) 
Quarterly Reviews in index form. The index was then converted into an average price of 
property using the average price of property used by Falzon, Zammit and Camilleri (2005). 
Income data and total number of employees were obtained from Eurostat in order to calculate 
per capita income levels. 
Table 2: Price to income ratio for flats and maisonettes (2002-2008) 
Property Type Oct-02 Mar-03 Nov-03 Nov-04 Aug-05 Sep-06 Nov-07 Nov-08 
Flats 4.4 5.3 5.3 6.3 7.0 6.7 6.8 6.1 
Maisonettes 6.1 6.6 6.6 7.8 8.8 8.7 8.3 7.9 
 
The contraction in demand was registered across the three categories that are 
employed by the Authority. Historically, the interest in the sale issues under analysis was 
substantially high relative to the number of units issued for sale by the Housing Authority. 
Nevertheless, in the sale issues of November 2007 and November 2008, there were situations 
where there were more units issued on the part of the Authority than valid applications within 
the particular category (see Table 3). 
Table 3:  Ratio of number of valid applications to number of units issued by category 
Year 
Ratio of number of valid applications (X) 
to number of  units issued by category (Y) 
Numbe
r 
of 
Permits
1 
Number 
of 
Marriage
s 
Permits1 
to 
Marriage
s Ratio Category A Category B Category C 
 X Y 
X/
Y X Y X/Y X Y 
X/
Y    
2002 83 156 1.88 99 608 6.14 13 22 
1.6
9 4323 2240 1.93 
2003 74 127 1.72 67 636 9.49 7 28 
4.0
0 5640 2350 2.40 
2003 89 128 1.4 46 432 9.39 8 33 4.1 5640 2350 2.40 
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4 3 
2004 82 106 1.29 48 548 
11.4
2 9 47 
5.2
2 6221 2402 2.59 
2005 79 180 2.28 40 359 8.98 13 49 
3.7
7 8594 2374 3.62 
2006 117 310 2.65 126 511 4.06 13 75 
5.7
7 9890 2536 3.90 
2007 121 108 0.89 134 108 0.81 18 40 
2.2
2 10957 2479 4.42 
2008 69 29 0.42 68 79 1.16 15 8 
0.5
3 6552 2482 2.64 
Overall 714 1144 
1.6
0 628 
328
1 5.22 96 
30
2 
3.1
5 57817 19213 3.00 
1Permits of apartments and maisonettes 
Thus, the decline in demand extended across all three categories under consideration. 
In absolute and relative terms, the highest demand during the period under consideration was 
registered in Category B. Therefore, engaged couples are the largest category that submitted 
applications to purchase their first home from the Housing Authority. The interest in the units 
issued for this category was, on average, more than five times higher than the stock issued 
during the period under review. Nevertheless, this statistic camouflages a notable structural 
shift that occurred during the period under analysis. In fact, although during the period from 
2002 to 2006, the number of valid applications per available unit targeted for category B 
hovered between 4 and 11 – a signal of notable excess demand by engaged couples for 
Housing Authority units – the number of applications was roughly equivalent to the units 
issued in the last two years under analysis.  
 Across all categories, the level of demand was highest when affordability for property 
purchasers was deteriorating on an annual basis. On the other hand, once affordability started 
improving, the data suggests that applicants opted to rely less on the Housing Authority, as 
evidenced by a decline in applications submitted for the units issued. This suggests that 
movements in affordability are the main driver underpinning demand for Housing Authority 
units, rather than, the affordability level per se. Moreover, the rapid decline in demand in the 
period 2007-2008 suggests that once affordability started improving, some applicants may 
have opted to delay their purchase and hence adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach to give time to 
the market to recalibrate itself. Furthermore it could also be the case that as property 
affordability started improving, individuals preferred to purchase directly from the market 
and hence avoid the social stigma that may still be attached to social housing by some 
quarters. 
 A paradox emerged when analysing the price to income ratios and the ratio of permits 
to marriages with respect to the ratio of valid applications to units issued for category B 
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(engaged couples). In particular, during the period 2002–2006, the real estate market appears 
to have operated rather inefficiently. At the time, prices were increasing at a sustained high 
pace, leaving a deteriorating effect on affordability as demonstrated by increasing price-to-
income ratios. This phenomenon is however hard to reconcile with the fact that during the 
same time, the ratio of permits per marriage was increasing in a steadfast manner too (with 
the number of permits increasing consistently and the number of marriages remaining 
relatively stable). It is pertinent to point out that during the period 2002-2006, around 2.8 
permits for the building of an apartment or maisonette was being issued for every registered 
marriage, as outlined in Table 3. The implicit assumption underlying this rationale is that 
newly-weds and engaged couples mainly tend to purchase apartments and maisonettes. 
Logically such dynamics would suggest that the market exhibited a combination of excess 
supply features, increasing prices and reductions in affordability which is clearly not in sync 
with basic principles of efficient markets. 
 One can counter-argue that the yardstick used to confirm the presence of excess 
supply in the market is rather simplistic since it ignores the demand for new housing – 
typically also in the form of small properties such as apartments and maisonettes – that is 
underpinned by single persons, and separated or divorced couples. However, the demand 
from the latter sub-group would likely have been rather small and insufficient to offset the 
‘new’ flow of excess supply that was being brought on the market. Moreover it is pertinent to 
point out that a stock of ‘old’ excess supply units had long been present in the Maltese 
property market. In the 1957 Census, vacant properties were 6.13 per cent of total housing 
stock. However, by 1995, the proportion of vacant properties in the total housing stock had 
increased to 23.0 per cent. In the Census of 2005, the proportion had increased further to 27.6 
per cent. 
 One major driver behind the buoyancy in the real estate market was the fact that 
between 1995 and 2003, commercial banks introduced a number of changes in the form of 
longer repayment periods and higher potential maximum loans which increased the amount 
that households could bid for a particular property (Falzon et al., 2005). In fact, commenting 
on this step, Pace (2009) reports that when this step was suggested, “The Central Bank’s 
governor… complained that the extension of mortgages by banks from 25 to 40 years may 
have facilitated the further raising of prices – but the Malta Financial Services Authority 
reported back [approving this extension]” (p. 360).  The fact that affordability deteriorated so 
rapidly in the early part of the previous decade is likely to have been the major driver behind 
European Scientific Journal  February 2013 edition vol.9, No.4  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
49 
 
the high level of interest exhibited by applicants in respect of units offered for sale by the 
Housing Authority. 
 
Stylized facts underpinning demand 
Shared ownership schemes are not particularly popular amongst engaged couples 
 Table 4 outlines that in the issues that constituted shared ownership (2005-2007), 
engaged couples represented between 41.7 per cent and 61.0 per cent of the applicants. In the 
other sale issues, engaged couples represented between 67.5 per cent and 80.4 per cent of the 
applicants. This would suggest that shared ownership is less appealing to engaged couples but 
more appealing to married couples, single parents and single persons. 
Table 4: Percentage of valid applications by Civil Status 
 Sale Issue 
Civil Status Oct-02 
Mar-
03 
Nov-
03 
Nov-
04 
Aug-
05* 
Sep-
06* 
Nov-
07* 
Nov-
08 
Engaged 77.4 80.4 72.8 68.3 61.1 55.8 41.7 67.5 
Married 11.8 8.2 9.5 11.5 13.3 12.6 17.8 10.3 
Separated 0.1 0.6 1.9 1.8 5.3 4.2 3.9 1.7 
Single parent 7.5 7.2 12.1 14.3 15.3 21.1 22.4 13.7 
Divorced 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.0 
Annulled 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 
Single 
person 3.2 3.6 3.7 2.7 5.1 5.8 10.4 6.8 
Not Declared _ _ _ _ _ 0.1 3.1 _ 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*shared ownership 
 This suggests that the introduction of shared ownership schemes from the year 2005 
onwards was a step in the right direction on the part of the policymaker in that it enabled 
certain individuals who otherwise would have not been able to do so, to enter the property 
ladder.  
The group of individuals eligible to apply for units from the housing authority has been 
implicitly increasing steadily during the period under review. 
 The target market which the Housing Authority seeks to focus on is determined, 
amongst other factors, by the maximum income for single and joint applicants that is imposed 
in the different sale issues that are carried out by the Housing Authority.  
Table 5: Maximum income for single and joint applicants under the sale issues 
Sale 
Issue 
Single 
applicants 
Income (€) 
Joint 
applicants 
Income (€) 
House 
price 
Index 1 
Wage 
index 
Single 
applicants 
maximum 
income index 
Joint 
applicants 
Maximum 
income index 
Oct-02 13976 19899 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Mar-03 15141 20964 111.8 100.1 108.3 105.4 
Nov-03 15141 20964 111.8 100.1 108.3 105.4 
Nov-04 15141 20964 136.3 102.8 108.3 105.4 
Aug-05 17470 23293 152.9 103.5 125.0 117.1 
Sep-06 19800 25630 159.4 109.9 141.7 128.8 
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Nov-07 19800 25623 159.2 112.1 141.7 128.8 
Nov-08 20000 35000 154.5 118.0 143.1 175.9 
1 pertaining to apartments and maisonettes 
Table 5 shows that the maximum income has been increased considerably during the 
period 2002-2008. In fact, the maximum income that a single applicant can have in order to 
apply for a housing unit from the Authority was increased from around €14,000 in 2002 to 
€20,000 in 2008. Similarly the maximum income of joint applicants was increased from a 
maximum level of €20,000 in 2002 to a level of €35,000 in 2008. Changes in the maximum 
threshold can alter the segment of households that can apply, and hence can indirectly 
influence the level of demand for housing units from the Housing Authority. 
 The increase in property prices in Malta from 2002 to 2008 based on Quarter 2, as 
measured by the chain linked Laspeyres index based on the unconstrained Hedonic model 
was 81.4 per cent (Falzon & Lanzon, forthcoming); while the basic indices for advertised 
property prices for the same period showed an average price increase of 61.9 per cent and 
72.7 per cent for apartments and maisonettes respectively (CBM, 2012a). Meanwhile during 
the same period, average wages (national accounts definition) increased by a much lower 
amount, registering solely an 18 per cent increase (CBM, 2012b). The latter confirms the 
notable deterioration in affordability that was witnessed during the period, as outlined above. 
 An analysis of the magnitude of increases in joint and single applicant’s maximum 
threshold revealed that they increased by 75.9 per cent and 43.1 per cent respectively during 
the period 2002-2008. The latter suggests that the maximum threshold was gradually 
increased by the Housing Authority in line with the strong increases in house prices, and was 
not adjusted solely for the periodic increases registered in wages during the period. This 
policy implicitly resulted in a situation where the target group that was eligible to apply for 
units from the Housing Authority and hence purchase housing accommodation at subsidized 
rates was gradually being made larger. This occurred during a time where more and more 
individuals were finding it harder to purchase their own property and enter into the property 
market. This adjustment in a key policy variable on the part of the policymaker was highly 
commendable and is likely to be a key attribute that can explain the notable increase in 
demand as exhibited by the rapid rise in the absolute number of valid applicants per unit 
during the period 2002-2006. The latter element transcends all categories, as outlined in 
Table 3.  
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The major part of joint applicants is in employment 
 Table 6 shows the distribution of applicants by economic activity. It is evident that 
most males are gainfully occupied.   
Table 6: Economic Activity of male applicants with a partner by Category (A and B) 
Sale 
issue Oct-02 Mar-03 Nov-03 Nov-04 Aug-05 Sept-06 Nov-07 Nov-08 
 A B A B A B* A B A B A B A B A B 
Employe
d 85 
83.
9 
74.
4 
85.
7 
85.
7 
35.
1 
91.
2 
89.
1 
76.
9 
90.
8 
79.
1 
89.
2 
93.
5 
96.
3 
83.
3 
96.
2 
Unemplo
yed 
10.
8 7.7 
12.
3 5.2 8.9 1.6 5.9 4.7 18 3.1 
12.
2 3.1 6.5 0.0 
16.
7 1.3 
Inactive 4.3 0.0 12.3 0.3 1.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 5.1 1.1 7.8 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.3 
Student 0.0 8.4 0.0 7.7 0.0 2.8 0.0 6.2 0.0 4.7 0.0 6.7 0.0 2.8 0.0 1.3 
Retired 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 2.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.8 60.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
*the data for this category was not completely inputted into the data base due to time restrictions 
Since the analysis concerns persons who are applying to buy a property, it is not 
surprising that the vast majority of the applicants are in employment. This is also partially a 
direct result of the framework adopted by the Authority, in that to favour applicants in 
employment, a high number of points were allocated to such applicants under the November 
2007 sale issue. Moreover, under the sale issue of November 2008, employment was made an 
eligibility criterion. Although this may appear to result in a situation in which housing 
initiatives are not sufficiently addressing the needs of the unemployed, the fact that the 
policymaker favours applicants in employment is rational and appropriate in that to afford to 
purchase a property the household would need to be able to make repayments. This ability 
can only be ensured if the household has at least one member that is in employment. Other 
initiatives, such as subsidized rentals are more suited to target the long-term unemployed. 
A surprisingly relatively high portion of single applicants in Category A and Category 
C are unemployed 
 Although most applicants are in employment, it is surprising that the percentage of 
unemployed applicants is considerably high amongst single applicants under Category A and 
Category C across all sales issues particularly under the most recent sale issues. In this 
regard, single females tend to have a higher unemployment and not economically active rate 
than men, as outlined in Table 7.  
Table 7: Economic Activity of the single female applicants by Category (A and B) 
Sale 
issue Oct-02 Mar-03 Nov-03 Nov-04 Aug-05 Sept-06 Nov-07 Nov-08 
 A B A B A B* A B A B A B A B A B Employe
d 
67.
2 
72.
2 
63.
0 
94.
1 
70.
2 
71.
4 
59.
9 
90.
0 
62.
7 
92.
0 
61.
8 
86.
2 
84.
2 
10
0 
94.
5 
85.
7 
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Unemplo
yed 3.0 0.0 
26.
0 0.0 
17.
9 
23.
8 
31.
8 
6.6
7 
35.
7 8.0 
35.
6 
12.
3 
13.
2 0.0 5.3 
14.
3 
Inactive 28.4 
22.
2 6.9 5.9 
11.
9 
4.8
0 6.8 
3.0
0 1.6 0.0 1.8 1.5 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Student 0.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.33 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Retired 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
N.A. 0.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
10
0 
*the data for this category was not completely inputted into the data base due to time restrictions 
 The fact that a considerable portion of single applicants in categories A and C are 
either unemployed or economically inactive is rather worrying. Applicants are essentially 
purchasing a property and hence in taking out a mortgage, a stable income from employment 
is a necessary pre-requisite to enable the individual concerned to meet the repayment 
commitments. It is highly questionable whether such applicants are better off purchasing a 
property, even though the latter would be sold at a subsidized price, rather than actually being 
provided with social housing at subsidized rent. It is only if a change in employment position 
occurs, such that the individual manages to find stable employment, that it would be wise for 
the individual to consider moving out of subsidized rent and seek to purchase property, 
potentially at a subsidized price. 
 The fact that a number of unemployed or economically inactive individuals are 
willing to commit to purchase subsidized property suggests that this feature could expose the 
fact that such applicants are actually working in the shadow economy. This would explain 
why they believe – potentially correctly – that they would be able to purchase the property 
and service the loan repayments. The latter calls into question the possibility that there exists 
the potential that part of the stock of subsidized housing that is sold by the Housing Authority 
ends up being purchased by individuals who actually have more financial resources than 
individuals who are not able to attain sufficient points that would ensure an allocation of a 
unit by the Housing Authority. 
Applicants appear not to mind living in different regions from the ones they currently 
live in 
 The Housing Authority received 4,611 applications in the sales issues from 2002 to 
2008. The regional distribution of applicants interested in purchasing a property from the 
Housing Authority is outlined in Table 8. Around 16.2 per cent of those applying in the 
different sales issues under consideration hail from Region 6 followed by 10.5 and 10.2 per 
cent coming from Regions 3 and 10 respectively . The rest of this paper is based only on the 
first seven issues because there is no data available from the last sale issue of 2008 about the 
topics to be discussed in the remaining sections. When applicants submit the application, they 
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list down their preference in relation to which units they would accept to buy taking into 
consideration the type of unit, size and the locality. The regional distribution of the first five 
preferences placed by applicants under each sale issue according to each category is outlined 
in Table 9. 
 Implicitly the first five preferences are being considered as sufficient in giving a 
proxy of the regions in which applicants would like to purchase a property in.  Thus Table 9 
sheds light on where the applicants would accept to live. It should be noted however that 
applicants do not have an open choice to choose any locality in Malta and Gozo but are 
restricted to choose a unit from those localities in which the Housing Authority issued units 
for sale. 
Table 8: Regional distribution of applicants 
Region 1 Cat A Cat B Cat C Total Percentage 
1 36 126 18 180 3.9 
2 124 182 20 326 7.1 
3 129 320 17 486 10.5 
4 106 211 23 340 7.4 
5 53 173 10 236 5.1 
6 166 532 48 746 16.2 
7 76 296 20 392 8.5 
8 83 217 27 327 7.1 
9 66 290 15 371 8.1 
10 92 345 34 471 10.2 
11 108 309 25 442 9.6 
12 42 120 9 171 3.7 
13 34 81 8 123 2.7 
Total 1115 3202 294 4611 100 
 
Table 9: Regional Distribution of the applicants’ first five preferences (2002-2007) 
Region Demand 
Percentage of  Total 
Demand (2002-2007) 
 
Category 
A 
Category 
B 
Category 
C Overall 
1 68 80 39 187 0.9 
2 645 605 152 1402 6.7 
3 71 94 15 180 0.9 
4 1394 4164 440 5998 28.5 
5 315 1949 69 2333 11.1 
6 514 1092 133 1739 8.3 
7 285 570 61 916 4.4 
8 424 2613 94 3131 14.9 
9 717 1895 110 2722 12.9 
10 101 398 17 516 2.5 
11 253 767 28 1048 5.0 
12 64 212 3 279 1.3 
13 127 356 111 614 2.9 
Total 4998 14795 1272 21065 100.0 
 
 Comparing the regions from where the applicants come from, to where they accept to 
live, applicants accept to live in different regions than the ones they currently live in. Table 9 
shows that the regions with the highest number of applications were Region 4 (28.5 per cent), 
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Region 8 (14.9 per cent) and Region 9 (12.9 per cent), and more importantly, the majority of 
applicants accept to live outside their district. The question that remains unanswered is why 
some applicants end up refusing the offered accommodation. This clearly warrants further 
research before any strong conclusions can be drawn.     
The majority of applicants across the different categories seem to prefer three bedroom 
apartments even though smaller units may be adequate given the number of children 
and the number of persons in the household 
 Table 10 shows that 88.2 per cent of applicants in Category A preferred to purchase a 
three-bedroom unit. Admittedly, given that Category A applicants are mainly families with 
children, three bedroom units tend to be the most adequate. However two bedroom units can 
also be adequate, depending on the number of children and their gender.  
Table 10: First preference of Category A applicants in relation to size and type of unit 
Sale Issue Apartment Maisonette House 
 
(3 
bed) 
(2 
bed) 
(1 
bed) 
(3 
bed) 
(2 
bed) 
(1 
bed) 
(3 
bed) 
Oct-02 71 6 0 67 2 0 9 
Mar-03 66 5 0 52 4 0 0 
Nov-03 102 12 0 10 3 0 1 
Nov-04 59 2 0 44 1 0 0 
Aug-05 92 13 0 38 0 0 0 
Sep-06 143 28 0 131 2 0 3 
Nov-07 64 39 8 0 0 0 0 
Total – units 597 105 8 342 15 0 13 
% of 1st 
Preferences 55.3 9.7 0.7 31.7 1.4 0.0 1.2 
 
 Similarly, engaged couples under category B also tend to prefer to live in a three-
bedroom unit (Table 11). In fact, a staggering 95.3 per cent of applicants prefer to live in a 
three-bedroom unit, even though a two bedroom apartment can be considered adequate for 
engaged couples especially as a starter home. These results show that the expectations of 
Maltese couples tend to focus more on a long term solution rather than a temporary starter 
home. This phenomenon transcends even in the preferences of Category C applicants (Table 
12). Usually units issued for Category C applicants are one or two bedroom apartments due to 
their single person status. However from the preferences of the applicants, 78.3 per cent of 
these single applicants still opt for a three-bedroom apartment, maisonette or house.  
Table 11: First preference of Category B applicants in relation to size and type of unit 
Sale Issue Apartment Maisonette House 
 
(3 
bed) 
(2 
bed) 
(1 
bed) 
(3 
bed) 
(2 
bed) 
(1 
bed) 
(3 
bed) 
Oct-02 113 6 0 393 7 0 89 
Mar-03 195 2 0 437 1 0 0 
Nov-03 254 21 0 33 10 0 114 
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Nov-04 77 2 0 21 0 0 1 
Aug-05 98 7 0 217 0 0 0 
Sep-06 137 16 0 344 5 0 17 
Nov-07 57 50 0 0 0 0 0 
Total – units 931 104 1 1445 23 0 221 
% of 1st 
preferences 34.2 3.8 0.0 53.0 0.8 0.0 8.1 
 
Table 12: First preference of Category C applicants in relation to size and type of unit 
Sale Issue Apartment Maisonette House 
 
(3 
bed) 
(2 
bed) 
(1 
bed) 
(3 
bed) 
(2 
bed) 
(1 
bed) 
(3 
bed) 
Oct-02 6 8 0 5 2 0 1 
Mar-03 10 5 0 6 7 0 0 
Nov-03 8 15 0 1 7 0 2 
Nov-04 154 18 1 328 1 0 47 
Aug-05 5 26 3 3 1 0 0 
Sep-06 13 16 22 10 5 9 0 
Nov-07 8 11 0 7 13 0 0 
Total – units 204 99 26 360 36 9 50 
% of 1st 
preferences 26.0 12.6 3.3 45.9 4.6 1.1 6.4 
 
This behaviour could be attributed to three possible explanations. Firstly, it could be 
that applicants are being rational and are seeking to optimize the amount of subsidy that they 
get from the Housing Authority in respect of the property purchase. In essence, the larger the 
property, the larger the implicit subsidy in absolute terms and hence the tendency of 
applicants to opt for the larger three-bedroom units could be attributable to the fact that they 
would like to maximize the amount of subsidy they receive. Secondly, it could be that 
economic agents in Malta do not solely purchase a property in order to address the 
fundamental basic need of having shelter. Many individuals opt to purchase property for the 
purpose of investing (Falzon et al., 2005). In essence, property serves two purposes, namely: 
shelter and a saving product. However, it should be noted that recent legislation has 
authorised Housing Authority to buy back any house sold by it (after the law’s enactment) at 
the same social price it sold it, limiting the use of such social housing as savings and a step up 
the property ladder.  Thirdly, the vast majority of applicants opt for the larger three-bedroom 
units – even applicants in category C who are essentially single – suggesting that the 
applicants may not be single in reality but opt to classify themselves accordingly to attain a 
higher level of benefit entitlement from Government. Hence for example, a defacto couple 
may opt to register themselves as single individuals since this may likely increase the level of 
benefits that the female adult in the household gets in social security benefits from the State.  
 
European Scientific Journal  February 2013 edition vol.9, No.4  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
56 
 
Category C applicants (namely: single persons, separated persons without children 
living with them and youths leaving institutions) tend to have a higher preference for 
the units which are not issued for their respective category 
 At application stage, applicants have to submit their preferences by giving a number 
(‘1’ as first preference, ‘2’ as second preference, etc.) to a unit according to their liking. 
Applicants can give a preference to one unit or all units, and there is no limit in the 
application to the number of units an applicant can choose. In this analysis it is assumed that 
a preference from ‘1’ to ‘5’ indicates a serious interest on the part of the applicant with 
respect to a particular unit. Table 13 shows that Category C applicants tend to prefer the units 
that are not issued for their respective category. In fact, 69.0 per cent of the latter applicants 
preferred units that are not issued for category C. A corollary of this fact is that 34.6 per cent 
of the units issued for category C did not fall within the first five preferences of applicants 
under this category (see Table 14). This further confirms the serious mismatch that appears 
between the units issued by the Authority and the preferences of applicants. This mismatch is 
most acute in respect of Category C applicants. 
Table 13: Demand for Category C applicants under all schemes 
Region 
Property 
Issued 
for C 
Demand  
for C  
(pref. 1-
5) 
All 
units 
issued 
Total 
demand 
for  all 
units 
(pref. 1-5) 
Demand for 
C as 
percentage 
of total 
demand 
Demand for 
units not 
issued for C 
Demand for 
units not 
issued for C as 
percentage of 
total demand 
  (X)  (Y) (X/Y) (Z) (Z/Y) 1 2 30 5 39 76.9 9 23.1 
2 10 67 165 152 44.1 85 55.9 
3 0 0 11 15 0.0 15 100.0 
4 17 94 308 440 21.4 346 78.6 
5 6 15 147 69 21.7 54 78.3 
6 14 76 89 133 57.1 57 42.9 
7 2 42 56 61 68.9 19 31.2 
8 2 17 87 94 18.1 77 81.9 
9 15 36 179 110 32.7 74 67.3 
10 1 2 16 17 11.8 15 88.2 
11 6 8 61 28 28.6 20 71.4 
12 0 3 20 3 100.0 0 0.0 
13 6 4 133 111 3.6 107 96.4 
Total 81 394 1277 1272 31.0 878 69.0 
 
Table 14: Units which have not been shortlisted by clients by Category (A, B, and C) 
Sales 
Issue 
Units issued 
for category 
A with no 
preference 
from 1-5 
% of non 
preferred 
unit from 
total issued 
(Category A) 
Units issued 
for category 
B with no 
preference 
from 1-5 
% of non 
preferred 
unit from 
total issued 
(Category B) 
Units issued 
for category 
A with no 
preference 
from 1-5 
% of non 
preferred 
unit from 
total issued 
(Category C) 
Oct-02 8 9.6 5 5.1 2 15.4 
Mar-03 11 14.9 6 9.0 0 0.0 
Nov-03 15 16.9 1 2.2 2 25.0 
Nov-04 20 24.4 1 2.1 7 77.8 
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Aug-05 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 15.4 
Sep-06 1 0.9 2 1.7 0 0.0 
Nov-07 71 58.7 73 54.5 15 83.3 
Overall 126 19.5 88 16.0 28 34.6 
 
Although the volume of applicants is quite large giving rise to excess demand, 
paradoxically a sizeable stock of units by the Housing Authority tends to end up unsold 
 Despite the large number of applications received under each sale issue, the Housing 
Authority ended up with an average of 37 per cent of the units issued not allocated to any 
applicant over the sales issues under review. The procedure when a unit is allocated and 
refused is that the Housing Authority reallocates that unit to other applicants in line with the 
conditions of the scheme. However, the Authority cannot continue with reallocations forever, 
and therefore it has to set a limit until how many reallocations can be made. Usually this 
occurs up to 3 reallocations. Units are then reissued in following sales issues. The non-
allocation of units occurs either because the applicants refuse the allocation, or because no 
one listed down the unit under his/her preference of units they wish to purchase. A total of 
483 units across the different categories remained unallocated in the different sales issues 
occurring in the period 2002-2007. The latter includes duplicate units due to reissues of the 
same unit in more than one sale issue. Nevertheless, it is very surprising that notwithstanding 
the large number of valid applications, only a small percentage was finally allocated, 
implying that the Authority ends up with a stock of units that do not get allocated. Table 15 
also shows that the problem of non-allocated units prevails in all categories. In fact across the 
different categories, non-allocated units as a percentage of units issued ranges from 35.9 per 
cent to 39.1 per cent across the different categories. 
Table 15: Allocations accepted and units not accepted 
Sale 
Issue 
Units allocated and 
accepted as 
percentage of units 
issued 
Units allocated as 
percentage of 
number of 
applications 
Units not allocated 
as percentage of 
units issued 
A B C A B C A B C 
Oct-02 78.3 73.7 61.5 41.7 12.0 36.4 21.7 26.3 38.5 
Mar-03 85.1 83.6 85.7 49.6 8.8 21.4 14.9 16.4 14.3 
Nov-03 67.4 91.3 50.0 46.9 9.7 12.1 32.6 8.7 50.0 
Nov-04 45.1 83.3 44.4 34.9 7.3 8.5 54.9 16.7 55.6 
Aug-05 79.8 65.0 53.9 35.0 7.2 14.3 20.3 35.0 46.2 
Sep-06 78.6 67.5 76.9 29.7 16.6 13.3 21.4 32.5 23.1 
Nov-07 10.7 27.6 66.7 12.0 34.3 30.0 89.3 72.4 33.3 
Total 60.9 64.1 63.0 35.3 11.2 17.4 39.1 35.9 37.0 
 
 Explaining why a sizeable number of units end up not allocated is difficult, in that the 
issue could boil down to a combination of issues. One plausible explanation could be that the 
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standards (such as for example, size of bathroom) of some of the units which the Housing 
Authority builds are not in sync with the requirements/desires of applicants. A more 
convincing explanation could be that a number of applicants opt to apply as a ‘safety option’, 
and only opt to purchase property from the Housing Authority if they do not find suitable 
accommodation within their budget from the private sector. Hence, an applicant would only 
be willing to purchase a unit from the Housing Authority if the applicable price is sufficiently 
discounted. The credibility of this proposition is further enhanced in view of the fact that a 
sizeable number of those interested to purchase a unit - and list down such unit within the 
first five preferences - still tend to refuse such allocation. Thus, from 238 refusals over the 
period 2002–2007, 133 (55.9 per cent) of the refusals relate to an allocation of a unit falling 
within the first five preferences, with 20.2 percentage points relating to an allocation of a unit 
listed as first preference. 
 In the sales issues under review, the average subsidy hovered between 15.0 to 38.0 
per cent. Moreover under most sale issues, the percentage of subsidy was not constant 
towards all units. It could be the case that a subsidy of 15.0 per cent is not considered as a 
sufficient discount incentive to purchase the property from the Housing Authority by 
economic agents. In this regard, one should note that some individuals may hold certain 
reservations in respect of units built by the Housing Authority due to some social stigma in 
respect of the stereotype community living in housing units built by the Authority. If the 
latter applied, rational economic agents would only purchase such units at a sufficient price 
discount, which may not necessarily apply in all instances when the Housing authority sells 
units to applicants.  
Although affordability in respect of the average applicant appears acceptable, the 
highest subsidized price to income ratio for each category suggests the possibility of 
unsustainable affordability in such borderline instances 
 Historically, the acceptable affordability which tends to enable households to 
comfortably purchase a housing unit within affordable parameters is taken to be a price to 
income ratio of between 6 or 7. As outlined in Table 16, the absolute majority of applicants 
under all schemes had an affordability ratio below this level. This confirms that in the major 
part of cases the Housing Authority has been effective in ensuring that the subsidies given are 
sufficient to ensure that low income households are not overly burdened. Notwithstanding, it 
is pertinent to point out that some beneficiaries’ affordability ratio exceeded the average of 
the other beneficiaries in the same category. Moreover, if one looks at the highest subsidized 
price to income ratio for each category, it is clear that a substantial number of these 
beneficiaries did not afford to purchase the allocated unit with the income and means 
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declared in the application, as per outlined in Table 16. This is an issue of concern and sheds 
further light on the proposition outlined earlier, that some individuals may intentionally be 
claiming a low income in their application due to the fact that either they register as 
unemployed and work illegally in the shadow economy, or allege minimal income to increase 
the likelihood of being allocated a unit by the Housing Authority. 
Table 16: Average subsidized price to income ratio by category (A, B, and C) 
Sale 
issue 
Average 
subsidized 
price to 
income ratio 
Highest subsidized 
price to income 
ratio 
% of beneficiaries 
with subsidized 
price to income 
ratio higher than 
average 
 A B C A B C A B C 
Oct-02 5.4 3.5 7.6 15.6 9.8 35.1 38.0 42.0 13.0 
Mar-03 6.1 4.0 3.2 28.8 17.6 5.6 38.0 29.0 66.0 
Nov-03 9.4 5.1 5.2 108.8 33.7 7.6 23.0 31.0 50.0 
Nov-04 5.4 4.9 3.9 12.2 15.9 6.6 49.0 38.0 50.0 
Aug-05 4.6 _ 5.5 17.2 _ 11.1 38.0 _ 43.0 
Sep-06 4.1 _ 2.4 21.6 _ 4.3 32.0 _ 22.0 
Nov-07 3.4 5.5 3.6 5.1 8.7 5.3 41.0 40 33.0 
Conclusion 
Summary of Major Findings 
 The data suggests that after registering sustained demand in the first part of the last 
decade, in the last two years under analysis the demand for housing units issued by the 
Housing Authority registered a notable decline. The data shows that although the major part 
of applicants is in employment, a segment of applicants are unemployed or economically 
inactive which could be a cause of concern. A further characteristic of the underlying demand 
for social housing suggests that applicants prefer to go for the larger option of a three 
bedroom unit even though a smaller unit would suffice. Finally, it was observed that, 
although the volume of applicants is quite large giving rise to excess demand, paradoxically a 
sizeable stock of units by the Housing Authority tends to remain unsold. 
Recommendations  
 The stylized facts discussed above give rise to a number of recommendations. From 
the evidence presented, most applicants accept to choose to live in a different region from 
where they currently live. Thus, this gives the Housing Authority some flexibility in choosing 
the areas where to build housing units for sale. Despite this, one needs to take into 
consideration that under the sales issues, applicants do not have an open choice to choose 
from any locality in Malta and Gozo, but are restricted to choose from those localities in 
which the Housing Authority issued units for sale. In this respect, it might be beneficial if the 
Housing Authority would conduct a survey among its prospective candidates applying for the 
units offered to find out their preferred localities and preferred characteristics of housing 
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units. It could be that the stock of unsold properties that is referred to earlier could result from 
various reasons such as the price, locality, or the location, the design, the size of rooms, the 
view from the windows, the lack of a balcony or a yard and the particular neighbourhood the 
apartment is located in.  
 A second recommendation is that more awareness should be given to applicants on 
the dynamics of the application process. In this regard, applicants need to understand that if 
their category is Category A and they apply for units issued for Category B, they are probably 
prima facie excluding the possibility of being allocated a unit. Applicants should be 
encouraged to choose a unit issued under their category at least for their first ten preferences. 
This would increase their chance that they might be allocated a unit according to their 
preference, and thereby lowering the stock of unsold property built by the Housing Authority. 
 A third recommendation is that a database of the reasons for refusals in future sale 
issues is created. It is being furthermore recommended that an application fee is introduced to 
enhance the commitment of applicants. The fee should be reasonable (e.g., €100) so as not to 
place a burden on applicants nor make them indifferent if they lose it. This recommendation 
would also address the issue of high levels of refusals outlined earlier. In this regard, it is 
quite problematic that applicants listing a unit as a first preference end up refusing the 
allocation. For those applicants that refuse the allocation without a valid reason, the fee 
should not be refunded. 
 Another important reason for refusal is that many units have been sold on plan and 
therefore when applicants go and actually see the allocated unit built, they might not like the 
design, the lighting, or size of the rooms. This issue can be solved by ensuring that all units 
offered for sale are built before they are issued by the Housing Authority. This will ensure 
that interested parties can visit the units in advance before submitting their application.  
 Finally, the criteria of declared employment should be enforced in a rigorous manner. 
Some applicants that were allocated a unit had a very high price to income ratio. This is 
because some units were allocated to persons who were declared unemployed or had 
considerably low income. Not all applicants are actually in employment, as outlined in 
Stylized Fact 3. The rigorous application of the aforementioned criteria would ensure that 
applicants would have enough future income to be able to repay the bank loan on a regular 
basis, and that the repayment affordability will minimize the future financial burden of 
applicants. 
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Suggestions for Further Research 
 From this study, various avenues for further research emerge. An in-depth survey on 
the needs and desires of the end clients would better guide policy makers in their attempts to 
ensure that the stock of units that ends up unsold, as per outlined in Stylized Fact 8, is 
minimized as much as possible. It would also be interesting to investigate whether the 
lowering of the demand resulted from a shift in the demand to private provision as a sort of 
‘forced privatisation’ turning to the ‘unsubsidized’ private market because the social housing 
market was not a favourable or attractive enough option. Finally, the Housing Authority 
needs to seriously consider whether the building of new units for future sale issues is feasible. 
The problem of increasing vacant properties on the island needs to be tackled seriously and 
effectively since this is part of our limited environment being wasted and could be utilized for 
the benefit of those in need of social housing. Incentives need to be devised to encourage 
landlords to rent out their property rather than preferring to leave them empty. Such studies 
would better equip the Housing Authority in formulating an effective housing strategy which 
attempts to provide decent housing to strengthen our community and to provide a better 
setting in which to raise our children, whilst abiding to other objectives such as efficient use 
of land and housing, as well as environmental conservation.     
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